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10.1177/0002716205283080 603JanuaryTHE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMYFEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court rivals the
Supreme Court of the United States in protecting po-
litical democracy. Its jurisprudence of democracy has
shaped the course and character of German politics
while upholding the rule of law and defending the con-
stitutionally prescribed “free democratic basic order.” In
furtherance of these objectives, the Constitutional
Court has invalidated regulations limiting the rights of
minor parties and constitutionalizing measures
designed to stabilize Germany’s system of parliamentary
government. These purposes have been served by con-
stitutional decisions on voting rights, public funding of
election campaigns, dissolution of Parliament, and pro-
portional representation, including the limiting 5 per-
cent clause. These decisions, along with a discussion of
the Hessian Election Review Case—a reminder of Bush
v. Gore—are calculated to make political representation
both responsive and responsible and to anchor the polit-
ical system firmly in the democratic values at the heart of
the Basic Law.
Keywords: Germany; party finance; democracy; rep-
resentation; voting rights; parliament
This article focuses on the constitutionalismof democracy in Germany. The Basic Law,
Germany’s constitution, defines the nature of
this democracy in abundant detail. It provides
for its organization and procedures and imposes
substantive limits on its exercise. The constitu-
tion also empowers Germany’s Federal Consti-
tutional Court (FCC) to monitor the process of
democracy and to keep it tethered to constitu-
tional values. Over the course of the past fifty
years, the court has produced a significant body
of constitutional case law on the meaning and
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limits of democracy. In doing so, the FCC has played a major role in shaping the
character and course of German politics. Its decisions, and the willingness of Ger-
many’s political class to abide by its rulings, are partly responsible for transforming
what was once an underdeveloped political culture into one of the world’s most
advanced and influential parliamentary democracies, one unmistakably governed
by the rule of law.
Some preliminary remarks about the Basic Law and judicial review in Ger-
many will place the FCC’s decisional law on democracy in a more helpful context.
Accordingly, this article begins with a glance at Germany’s constitutionally pre-
scribed structure of democracy and popular sovereignty. It continues with a brief
discussion of the FCC’s jurisdiction and its role in the nation’s constitutional order
and then considers selected constitutional cases on democracy likely to interest
American readers. This short treatment is more descriptive than analytical. It is
mainly an overview of the FCC’s most important decisions on election law, political
parties, and parliamentary democracy. Along the way, and where relevant, it may
be useful to draw attention to the equivalent jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court.
Democracy and the Basic Law
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, adopted in 1949 in the
aftermath of Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, has evolved into one of
the world’s most influential constitutions. This is certainly the case if influence can
be measured by the frequency with which the Basic Law’s provisions—and institu-
tions—have been copied or adopted by constitution makers around the globe
(Kokott 1999). Most influential among these provisions are those dealing with Ger-
many’s parliamentary system of government, particularly the Basic Law’s decrees
on political parties and its internal order of democracy, together with its creation of
a constitutional court authorized to review and decide controversies arising under
these provisions. The following summary is confined mainly to those clauses and
paragraphs prominently featured in the constitutional cases discussed later in this
article.
Let us begin with Article 20, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law, which defines the
Federal Republic of Germany as a “democratic and social federal state” (emphasis
added). Paragraph 2 reinforces this concept by declaring that “all state authority
emanates from the people.” The next sentence, however, emphasizes the represen-
tative character of the governing process, for the authority emanating from the
people “shall be exercised by . . . means of elections and voting and by specific legis-
lative, executive, and judicial organs,” a system of representation, as the FCC has
frequently observed, that disallows all popular initiatives, plebiscites, or referenda
at the national level.1 In addition, Article 38, paragraph 1, provides that members
of Parliament (the Bundestag) “shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal, and
secret elections” and then stipulates that they “shall be representatives of the
whole people, not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their
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conscience.” Yet the Basic Law establishes political parties as major agencies of
political representation. Their function, according to Article 21, paragraph 1, is to
“participate in the formation of the political will of the people,” for which reason
the FCC has characterized Germany as a “party state” (Parteienstaat), one in
which political parties enjoy constitutional status, allowing them to adjudicate their
rights as primary agents of electoral politics (1 BVerfGE 208, 225: 1952).2
[T]he FCC [Federal Constitutional Court]
has evolved into one of Germany’s most
important policy-making institutions, a
remarkable development in view of the
nation’s long tradition of executive
predominance in constitutional matters.
As for electoral politics, it is important to note that members of the Bundestag
are elected for four years, a constitutional mandate that imposes severe limits on
the power to vote a chancellor out of office or to dissolve Parliament before the
expiration of the normal four-year election cycle. Under the so-called “constructive
vote of no confidence,” set forth in Article 67, the Bundestag may remove a chan-
cellor in a no confidence vote only by electing his successor simultaneously by a
majority of its members. A new federal election is permitted ahead of schedule,
however, only when the chancellor himself initiates procedures specified by Arti-
cle 68. First, he must formally move for a vote of confidence in the Bundestag; sec-
ond, the Bundestag by a majority of its members must vote against him; third, the
chancellor must then petition the federal president to dissolve the Bundestag;
fourth, the president must agree to do so and arrange for new elections to be held
within sixty days. Finally, as noted later in the article, each of these procedures is
subject to review in the FCC.
The electoral system as such, which the Basic Law empowers Parliament to
determine, is another distinctive feature of German democracy. From the outset—
since 1949—the system, often called “personalized” or “modified” proportional
representation (PR) (Sartori 1997), has combined single-member districts with
PR. Federal law now provides for 598 members of the Bundestag, one half of
whom are elected in single-member districts in which a plurality of votes is suffi-
cient to win; the other half is elected by PR. Accordingly, voters receive two ballots.
On the first, they record their choice of a district representative; on the second,
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 113
they vote for a closed list of party candidates. The outcome of the list ballot deter-
mines the total number of parliamentary seats allocated to each party. If, for exam-
ple, party A wins 38 percent of the national vote, it receives that percentage of
parliamentary seats. If the total number of district representatives equals less than
38 percent of party A’s parliamentary membership, the remaining representatives
are drawn from the list ballots until the prescribed percentage is reached. But if
party A wins no district seats, all of its members are drawn from party lists.
This system, however, is skewed in two ways. First, if a major party wins more
district seats than it would be entitled to under strict PR, it keeps these surplus or
“overhang” seats (Überhangsmandate), as they are called. Second, under the law’s
famous “barrier clause” (Sperrklausel), a party receiving less than 5 percent of the
national vote is excluded altogether from parliamentary representation unless it
wins at least three district seats, in which case it is entitled to representation pro-
portionate to its total national vote even though that vote is less than 5 percent. The
idea behind this electoral arrangement is that a party capable of winning three dis-
trict seats—a difficult achievement—has sufficient popular support to warrant full
representation under PR. But if the party wins one or two district seats—and no
more—and falls below the 5 percent requirement, it retains only these seats with
no additional ones under PR.
The Basic Law, finally, contains numerous references to the “free democratic
basic order” whose defense—like that of the principle of human dignity set forth in
Article 1—the state is duty-bound to protect. As deployed in the Basic Law, these
terms limit the boundaries of freedom for they do not protect the enemies of
democracy. For example, guaranteed rights such as freedom of expression or the
right to associate can be forfeited if used to combat democracy (Article 18). Most
important for present purposes is Article 21, paragraph 2, which declares “uncon-
stitutional” those political parties seeking to undermine or abolish the free demo-
cratic basic order. As with the forfeiture of basic rights, only the FCC may rule on
the question of a party’s constitutionality. Early on, in the famous Communist Party
Case, the FCC seized upon these and related provisions to describe the German
polity as a “militant democracy” (5 BVerfGE 85, 139: 1956).
The Federal Constitutional Court
The Basic Law re-created many of the political structures established by the
Weimar Constitution of 1919 but eliminated those crippling defects that weak-
ened Weimar’s democracy and facilitated Hitler’s rise to power. Several of the Basic
Law’s innovations have helped to stabilize Germany’s political system. These
include the elevated status of the chancellor as the nation’s political leader, the cor-
respondingly diminished power of the president, the constructive vote of no confi-
dence, the 5 percent Sperrklausel, and the difficulty of dissolving Parliament and
holding new elections ahead of schedule (Conradt 2001). Each has contributed to
the durability of Germany’s postwar democracy. But the most striking innovation
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of all was the creation of a constitutional court empowered to enforce guaranteed
rights and to decide other controversies arising under the Basic Law.3
Established in 1951 after months of parliamentary negotiations (Kommers
1976; Schlaich and Korioth 2001), the FCC has evolved into one of Germany’s
most important policy-making institutions, a remarkable development in view of
the nation’s long tradition of executive predominance in constitutional matters.
Organizationally, the FCC consists of two senates, each staffed by eight justices
elected by the legislative branch of the national government for nonrenewable
terms of twelve years.4 The two senates exercise mutually exclusive jurisdiction
that, taken together, extends to virtually all issues concerning the German nation—
from abortion policy to military and international affairs—even to pedestrian dis-
putes over the validity of rules pertaining to the correct usage of the German lan-
guage (98 BVerfGE 218: 1998). As a specialized court of constitutional review, the
FCC is the only tribunal in Germany empowered to declare statutes and other
governmental actions unconstitutional.
The Basic Law lists sixteen categories of constitutional disputes over which the
FCC has jurisdiction. The most important of these for present purposes are fed-
eral-state and separation of powers conflicts, abstract and concrete judicial review
proceedings, and constitutional complaints. Apart from constitutional complaints,
only governments and specified public officials have standing to petition the FCC
to resolve constitutional disputes. These “officials” include candidates for public
office and individual members of Parliament seeking to vindicate their electoral or
representational rights. Political parties may also petition the FCC in defense of
their corporate rights in and out of Parliament. Ordinary citizens may file constitu-
tional complaints but only after they have exhausted all other legal remedies. Char-
acteristically, in ordinary litigation before the regular courts, the conflicting parties
have no standing to raise constitutional issues. In regular or concrete judicial re-
view proceedings, only judges may place questions before the FCC and then only if
they seriously doubt the constitutionality of the law or laws they are called upon to
enforce or interpret. But the FCC is not limited to reviewing “cases and controver-
sies” in the American understanding of these terms. At the request of the federal
or a state government or one-third of the Bundestag’s members, the FCC may
resolve—in an abstract judicial review proceeding—mere doubts about the consti-
tutionality of an enacted law or the compatibility between federal and state law. A
major function of the FCC, as the guardian of the Basic Law, is precisely to resolve
such doubts when raised by major political officials or state actors in managing the
course of the nation’s public life. For the German public mind, this is what it means
to be governed by law, in this instance by the law of the constitution.
A glimpse at the court’s workload is enough to give us a sense of the importance
of judicial review in German life and law. In its fifty-three years, down to 2005, the
FCC has decided some 150,000 cases, 144,000 of which have been constitutional
complaints filed by individual citizens (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2004). The main
body of its jurisprudence is to be found in 113 volumes (to date) of official reports
consisting of some 2,700 full opinions. This vast body of constitutional law is fully
comparable, in significance and sophistication, to the decisional law of the U.S.
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Supreme Court, except that numerous disputes decided by the Constitutional
Court would be regarded as nonjusticiable in American courts. As underscored by
the frequency with which the FCC decides cases involving foreign and military
affairs, there is no equivalent in Germany to the American political question doc-
trine, although in many such cases the court applies a presumption of constitution-
ality (Franck 1992).
The Jurisprudence of Parliamentary Democracy
The law of democracy in Germany represents a vast jurisprudence. A trip
through this body of law would show that the FCC has decided controversies
touching almost every phase of electoral and parliamentary politics, including the
role, status, and funding of political parties. Nearly all these decisions pertain to the
quantity, quality, or equality of political representation (Jesse 1985; Currie 1994,
104-16). In a series of cases over the years, the FCC has handed down decisions
ordering higher salaries for legislative representatives (40 BVerfGE 296: 1975);
invalidating laws unduly restricting political parties from gaining access to the bal-
lot (3 BVerfGE 19: 1953; 5 BVerfGE 77: 1956; 12 BVerfGE 10: 1960); forbidding
political parties from changing the order in which candidates appear on party list
ballots (7 BVerfGE 77: 1957); limiting the conditions under which a minor parlia-
mentary party can be excluded from representation on a legislative committee (70
BVerfGE 324: 1986; 80 BVerfGE 188: 1989); barring Parliament from excluding a
representative from a legislative committee merely because he or she is not a mem-
ber of a political party (84 BVerfGE 304: 1991); and vindicating the rights of parlia-
mentary minorities to establish investigative committees to hear evidence of illegal
or improper conduct by a ruling governmental majority, largely on the theory that
in modern parliamentary democracies separation of powers manifests itself most
effectively not in the checks and balances among branches of government but in
the duty of opposition parties to confront and publicize the misdeeds of the ruling
majority (49 BVerfGE 70: 1978).
The remaining cases discussed in this article focus on constitutional policies
characteristic of Germany’s parliamentary system. They are important because
they implicate efforts to stabilize party government, to make political representa-
tion responsive and responsible, and to anchor the system more generally in the
democratic values at the heart of the Basic Law. The following pages cover five sets
of constitutional cases that are likely to fascinate readers not only for their intrinsic
merit but also for their contrast with American constitutional perspectives and pro-
cedures. The first category deals with PR and the 5 percent clause (Sperrklausel);
the second focuses on voting rights and their relationship to Germany’s PR system;
the third describes constitutional policies related to the public funding of political
parties; the fourth shifts attention to a recent election case vaguely reminiscent of
Bush v. Gore (531 U.S. 98 [2000]; and the fifth highlights the limits the Basic Law
places on the power to dissolve Parliament.
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PR and the Sperrklausel
As noted, Germany’s electoral system combines PR with single-member dis-
tricts (Kitzinger 1960). German law, however, qualifies PR by requiring a party to
garner at least 5 percent of the vote to enter the national Parliament. This personal-
ized PR system prevails in thirteen of Germany’s sixteen Länder. A simple PR system
prevails in Bremen, Hamburg, and Saarland, but these states have also adopted
In numerous decisions over the years . . . the
FCC has imposed severe limits on the scope and
allocation of public funding, virtually
micromanaging the field of party finance.
the 5 percent clause (Gunlicks 2003). Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the FCC has
ruled that single-member legislative districts are to be approximately equal in pop-
ulation (16 BVerfGE 130: 1963), but the addition of PR in its view makes the elec-
toral system as a whole both equal and fair. Finally, in the interest of effective gov-
ernance, the FCC has approved the use of the 5 percent clause (6 BVerfGE 84:
1957), although in one of its earliest decisions it ruled that only a compelling reason
would justify a threshold requirement beyond what it called the “common German
value of five percent” (1 BVerfGE 208:  1952).
In 1990, however, the court struck down the application of the 5 percent rule to
the first all-German election following reunification (82 BVerfGE 322: 1990). Cal-
culated to advance a constitutionalism of reconciliation and inclusion, this unani-
mous decision illustrates the protection the FCC customarily affords to minor par-
ties. In short, the court sought to ensure that certain political parties in the eastern
states, notably the previously dominant Communist Party—now called the Party of
Democratic Socialism (PDS)—would have a fighting chance to enter the new, all-
German Parliament.5 The FCC reiterated its view that the 5 percent threshold
is “constitutionally unobjectionable” as a general principle, but special circum-
stances may dictate a modification of the rule if the “political will of the electorate”
is to be realized. Accordingly, and on the FCC’s recommendation, the Bundestag
provided that the 5 percent clause should apply separately in east and west, thus
enabling the eastern Green Party and PDS to win parliamentary representation.
The rule would apply only to the 1990 election, giving the eastern parties a chance
to establish themselves nationally. The FCC made clear that Germany could revert
to its established electoral system in subsequent federal elections.
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In recent years, minor parties have mounted additional challenges to the 5 per-
cent rule. They have also questioned the constitutionality of overhang seats, alleg-
ing that they violate the principle of proportional representation. The practice of
awarding surplus seats to the major parties met its severest test in the Overhang
Mandate Case (95 BVerfGE 335: 1997), an abstract judicial review petition filed by
Lower-Saxony. In a four-to-four decision, the FCC’s Second Senate upheld the
validity of surplus mandates because the electoral system as a whole fostered a per-
sonal relationship between voters and their elected representatives. (It takes a
majority of the justices to nullify a law.) The dissenting justices argued that surplus
seats violated the principle of equality under PR, requiring a change in federal law.
In a related case, decided on the same day, the FCC sustained a decision of the
Bundestag to award the PDS the four district seats it had won in East Berlin, along
with the twenty-six seats it was entitled to under PR, a number equal to 4.4 percent
of the national vote it received in 1994. By vindicating the rule that such a party
should be entitled to proportional representation even though it fails to meet the
standard 5 percent requirement, the FCC felt that it was promoting equality
among the parties (95 BVerfGE 408: 1997).
Voting rights and democracy
As noted in the previous section, the FCC has not only enforced the principle of
direct, free, and equal suffrage, but also that of fair and effective representation.
The court has emphasized the importance of the personalized nature of the elec-
toral system, meaning that when citizens vote they cast their ballots for particular
candidates running in single-member districts and for the order in which candi-
dates appear on party lists (Kommers 1997, 181-97). A distinguishing feature of
these decisions is the direct link the FCC has sought to establish between the peo-
ple, voting, and public policy. As Article 20, paragraph 2, of the Basic Law declares,
“All state authority is derived from the people” and exercised by them “through
elections” and through “specific legislative . . . bodies.” The FCC has made clear
that the “people” in this instance refers to Germans and that any attempt to break
the link in the chain between the will of Germans and their representatives offends
the principle of democracy as laid down in the Basic Law.
The principle of democracy was implicated most notably in the celebrated
Maastricht Treaty Case (89 BVerfGE 155: 1993). Maastricht was a surprise pro-
cedurally because the FCC accepted it as justiciable in the form of individual con-
stitutional complaints under the right-to-vote provisions of Article 38. In their
complaints, voters alleged that by transferring certain legislative powers to the
European Union without the consent of Parliament, the government would invade
their rights as voters and undermine the principles of both democracy and popular
sovereignty. Although the FCC found the treaty compatible with the Basic Law, it
warned the government that the EU threatened to break the chain of legitimation
between voters and their representatives. In a highly controversial opinion, and a
unanimous one at that, the FCC suggested that the transfer of authority to the EU
in the face of its “democratic deficit” would diminish the voting rights of the peo-
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ple—the German people—and the authority of the elected parliament responsible
to them for the powers it exercises. The court’s decision produced shockwaves
throughout Germany and Europe. Despite holding that the national Parliament
retained sufficient control over its powers to satisfy the principle of democracy, the
court faulted the EU for its lack of democratic representation, suggesting along the
way that the legitimacy of EU policy will depend on maintaining the link between
German voters, their national parliament, and the European Parliament (Pernice
1993; Kokott 1994; Meeson 1994; Foster 1994).6
Three years before Maastricht, the court had ruled that the concept of “the peo-
ple” for the purpose of voting included only German citizens and not foreign resi-
dents working in Germany. Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg had permitted for-
eign residents to vote in local elections. The FCC nullified the laws of both Länder.
Voters, the court said, must be citizens unified by their common membership in
and allegiance to the “body politic” (83 BVerfGE 37: 1990; 83 BVerfGE 60: 1990).
Two years later, however, the Maastricht Treaty extended the franchise to all Euro-
pean citizens residing in a member state. It was clear that a constitutional amend-
ment would be necessary to validate the treaty provision. Accordingly, in Decem-
ber 1992, the Basic Law was amended to grant the nationals of member states the
right to vote in local Land elections (Article 28 [1]), effectively nullifying the FCC’s
foreign voting decisions.
In the Official Propaganda Case, finally, the FCC refined its conception of rep-
resentative democracy. During the 1976 federal election campaign, the Social
Democratic–controlled government had distributed millions of informational
leaflets and brochures, including the text of various laws and treaties, describing
the records of and benefits conferred by federal ministries. The Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU) petitioned the FCC to ban this practice. In response, the court
ruled that the practice violated not only the principle of parliamentary democracy
under Article 20, but also the equality of political parties under Article 21 and the
principle of free and equal elections under Article 38. State agencies, said the
court, may not take sides during an election campaign. The Basic Law provides “for
a free and open process of forming the popular will” just as voters and parties must
be left free “to form and utter their opinions fully and openly.” Similarly, noted the
court, political parties must begin their election campaigns at the same starting line
if there is to be a free and equal process of forming, in the words of the Basic Law,
“the political will of the people.” Political scientists might well question a theory of
democracy that posits, empirically, a direct relationship between voting and the
people’s will, but it is one to which the FCC has faithfully adhered.
Public funding of political parties
A distinctive feature of German constitutionalism is the formal recognition of
political parties as “quasi-constitutional organs.” In fact, as noted earlier in this arti-
cle, Germany is officially known as a “party state” (Leibholz 1973, 68-94), one
described by Michaela Richter (1995, 37) as “a unique synthesis of Western parlia-
mentarism and the German state tradition.” The parliamentary tradition finds its
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 119
embodiment in the principle of popular sovereignty and the formal institutions of
democracy. The state tradition, on the other hand, is manifest in the Basic Law’s
formal recognition of political parties as agencies engaged in the process of “will
formation” and in their status—one the FCC has conferred by interpretation—
as “integral units of the constitutional state” (1 BVerfGE 208, 225: 1952). Al-
ready in 1954, the FCC ruled that in their capacity as constitutional organs of the
state, political parties may defend their institutional rights before the court in an
Organstreit (interbranch conflict) proceeding (4 BVerfGE 27: 1954), empowering
parties to challenge an infringement of their electoral rights much as a branch of
government would seek to vindicate its rights under the principle of separation of
powers.
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court has played a major role
in the field of party finance, but with results emphasizing equality of party competi-
tion over arguments rooted in free speech rights, as in the United States. In an early
case, the court invalidated tax provisions allowing individuals and corporations to
deduct their contributions to political parties for discriminating against those par-
ties—the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in particular—disfavored by wealthy
persons and the German business community. (A year earlier, the court had nulli-
fied a law disallowing tax deductions for contributions to political parties unless the
latter elected at least one representative to the national or a state parliament [6
BverfGE 273: 1957].) In this case, the court took the unusual step of recommend-
ing, in the interest of fair and equal elections, the public financing of election cam-
paigns. Parliament obliged, its enthusiasm for state financing fully matching the
generosity of its appropriations. By the late 1980s, total party income had reached
DM 608.5 million, 36 percent of which consisted of public subsidies; by 1994, pub-
lic subsidies accounted for 40 percent (DM 352 million) of the total party income
of the parties (Nassmacher 2001, 96).
In numerous decisions over the years, however, the FCC has imposed severe
limits on the scope and allocation of public funding, virtually micromanaging
the field of party finance. An inaugural party finance law was invalidated by the
court because it covered party activities well beyond campaign expenditures (20
BVerfGE 56: 1966). This decision sought to reconcile the tension between Articles
21 and 38. Under the first, parties are charged with competing for an electoral
mandate, but under the second, representatives are declared to be independent
and not bound by instructions. To allow financing unrelated to elections, said the
court, would give political parties a monopoly over the formation of public opinion.
Between elections, parties are fully entitled to raise money on their own, but they
do so as private entities. They assume the character of constitutional organs only in
their capacity as electoral organizations. Accordingly, public funding must be lim-
ited, constitutionally, to legitimate campaign expenses.
In subsequent decisions, the court has monitored laws relating to the disclo-
sure of party contributions, tax-deductible donations to the parties, and the formu-
lae for allocating public funds among the parties, imposing standards and limits
on each of these measures, all in the interest of establishing a level playing field
for political parties competing for a proportionate share of the national vote
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(Kommers 1997, 200-215). In one decision, the FCC lowered the publicity thresh-
old for contributions from the legislatively established figure of DM 40,000 to DM
20,000. As for public subsidies, the FCC disallowed legislation denying public
funding even to independent candidates and, in the same opinion, struck the de-
nial of funds to parties unrepresented in Parliament as well as to those receiving
[W]hile the court has limited the right of
foreign residents to vote in local and municipal
elections, it has otherwise sought to root
Parliament’s law-making powers in elections
and the exercise of the franchise.
less than 2.5 percent of the popular vote (41 BVerfGE 399: 1976). In fact, the court
proceeded to order Parliament to lower the 2.5 figure to 0.5 percent, a rule seem-
ingly undercutting the logic behind the FCC’s approval of the 5 percent clause. By
1992, however, the court concluded that it was no longer reasonable or practicable
to distinguish between campaign costs and other political party expenditures (85
BVerfGE 164: 1992). From now on, ruled the court, state funding could not exceed
the total amount raised by the parties themselves and, in a parting shot, ad-
monished the Bundestag to change the law accordingly by January 1993 (Gunlicks
1994).
Hessian Election Review Case
The Hessian Election Review Case (103 BVerfGE 111: 2001) arose out of a party
finance scandal in Hesse, one of Germany’s most populous states. It warrants
attention not only for the issues it raises but also for the affinity it bears to Bush v.
Gore (531 U.S. 98 [2000]), the controversial case that decided the American presi-
dential election of 2000 (Gillman 2001). Bush was controversial because many
legal scholars, including four dissenting justices on the Supreme Court, thought
the case failed to present a substantial federal question and should have been
decided at the state level. Others advanced the view that Bush presented a “politi-
cal question” unfit for judicial resolution (Chemerinsky 2001). Hessian Election,
on the other hand, like most cases coming before the FCC, stands for the proposi-
tion that any case arising under the Basic Law and properly before the court is fully
justiciable. Bush presents precisely the kind of issue—were such a case to arise in
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Germany—that the FCC would feel obliged to resolve. The idea that certain con-
stitutional issues, although legitimately before the FCC, should be dismissed be-
cause of their political character would offend the German sense of constitutional
justice and the rule of law.
The facts of Hessian Election, though complex, can be summarized briefly.
Christian Democrats, having narrowly won the 1999 Hessian state election,
formed a coalition government with Liberal Democrats, thus relegating Social
Democrats and the Alliance 90–Greens to the role of opposition, a rarity in this
largely SPD state. It was discovered later, however, that the CDU campaign had
been financed by illegal campaign funds stashed away in a Swiss bank account,
whereupon, relying on state law, Social Democrats sought to nullify the election.
State law provided for an Election Review Court (Wahlprüfungsgericht) com-
posed of both judges and legislators. Its jurisdiction included the power to void an
election resulting from a breach of “public morality,” a decision state law defined as
final. But when the review court opened its inquiry at the request of the SPD, the
new coalition government immediately challenged the proceeding before the
FCC in an abstract judicial review petition, arguing that the inquiry conflicted with
the constitutional principles of popular democracy, the rule of law, and separation
of powers (103 BVerfGE 111, 113-23: 2001). Three principal rulings emerged
from the FCC’s decision. First, the court found that the establishment of an elec-
tion review court was fully authorized by Article 28 of the Basic Law, requiring all
Land governments to conform to “the principle of a . . . democratic . . . state gov-
erned by the rule of law.” Second, the court sustained the validity of statutory provi-
sions providing for the nullification of an election tainted by bad morals. But the
court narrowly construed the meaning of “public morality,” declaring that the
offensive conduct must influence the election and significantly affect its outcome.
“Declaring an election invalid,” said the court, “requires electoral irregularities of
such magnitude that keeping the elected people’s representatives in office would
appear intolerable” (author’s translation). The FCC went on to hold that no such
breach occurred in the Hessian election. Third, the FCC ruled that the Election
Review Court contravened Article 92 of the Basic Law, which vests judicial power
in “judges.” Because the review court included legislators, said the FCC, it
offended the principle of separated powers. Also declared unconstitutional was the
inability to appeal the election court’s decisions to a higher court. The rule of law,
said the FCC, requires that its decisions be subject to appellate review. One month
later, finally, Hesse’s Election Review Court decided that the CDU’s use of illegal
funds, however regrettable, did not violate “public morality” as defined by the
FCC, and thus could not be said to have unlawfully influenced the outcome of the
state election (Miller 2004).
Without appearing to digress too far from the jurisprudence of democracy itself,
one might point out important differences between certain German and American
judicial practices. First, Hessian Election was a unanimous decision despite its par-
tisan nature and the even split on the Second Sensate between justices nominated
by the CDU and those nominated by the SPD. Bush v. Gore, by contrast, was a split
decision, with the court’s five “conservative” justices deciding in favor of Bush.
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Interestingly, German legal scholars known to the author have expressed surprise
and even disdain for the frequency of five-to-four decisions on the Supreme
Court—not to mention the multiplicity of concurring and dissenting opinions
found in numerous other cases—a practice they have a hard time reconciling with
clear rules of law. On the other hand, abstract judicial review is a practice that
would find little support among American lawyers and judges. Confining federal
judicial power to concrete “cases and controversies” is, of course, deeply embed-
ded in the common law tradition and American legal culture (Ripple 1984). It is
also the product of the Supreme Court’s respect for the legitimate roles of Con-
gress and the executive in the American system of government. In Germany, by
contrast, abstract and concrete review cases are not designed to vindicate an indi-
vidual’s claim to a constitutional right or even that of the official party petitioning
for review, but rather to vindicate the public’s interest in constitutional government
and the validity of law. At stake is the constitutional order itself as well as the
integrity of the legal order as a whole (Kommers 1997, 42-48).
Dissolving Parliament
This article goes to press just as the FCC has sustained the decision of the fed-
eral president to dissolve Parliament and to hold a national election—on Septem-
ber 18, 2005—a full year in advance of the regularly scheduled election. The con-
troversy surrounding this case might also remind Americans of Bush v. Gore, for
the questions it presents are as much political as constitutional, and they touch the
heart of Germany’s parliamentary democracy. The controversy began with Chan-
cellor Schröder’s recent plan to dissolve the Bundestag and hold a new federal elec-
tion ahead of time, a plan motivated by a string of local election defeats that left the
Social Democratic–Green coalition in charge of only four of Germany’s sixteen
states (Länder), compared to the eleven it controlled in 1998. A fresh election, it
was hoped, would produce a new governing mandate the chancellor desperately
wanted and needed. The chancellor, however, was not only taking a calculated
political risk; he was also betting on the strategy’s constitutionality. As noted earlier,
Parliament can be dissolved under Article 68 only when the chancellor initiates
a vote of no confidence, loses, and then requests the president to dissolve the
Bundestag in the hope that he will do so. These procedures should be distinguished
from the constructive vote of no confidence permitted by Article 67, pursuant to
which the Bundestag itself may remove a chancellor but only by simultaneously
electing his successor by a majority of its members. If confidence is withheld and
the Bundestag fails to elect a new leader, the chancellor remains in office at the
head of a minority government.
Article 67, like Article 68, was a master stroke of constitutional engineering, for
it has helped to stabilize Germany’s political system. Since the Bundestag cannot
dissolve itself, its members—that is, members of the governing parties—are ill dis-
posed to turn themselves out of a ruling coalition unless they are confident of
rejoining the government under a new chancellor. It is unsurprising, therefore,
that the Bundestag has invoked Article 67 only twice in the Federal Republic’s his-
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tory, first in 1972 when Willy Brandt barely held off a Christian Democratic chal-
lenge to his leadership and then again in 1982 when the Bundestag chose Helmut
Kohl to replace Helmut Schmidt as chancellor following the Free Democratic
Party’s decision to withdraw from the latter’s coalition and shift its support to Chris-
tian Democrats. Schröder’s initiative under Article 68, however, is the third time in
Germany’s postwar history that a chancellor has resorted to its procedures. Both
Brandt and Kohl sought early elections shortly after their just-mentioned victories
in the Bundestag in 1972 and 1982, respectively. In these two situations, the strat-
egy worked. The ensuing elections produced substantial parliamentary majorities
for both chancellors.
Counting on, or hoping for, a similar result, Chancellor Schröder initiated his
no confidence vote on July 1, 2005, and lost as planned, permitting him to peti-
tion the federal president for an order to dissolve the Bundestag. Had President
Horst Köhler concluded that the chancellor had contrived to lose a vote of confi-
dence, he might have disallowed the request on the ground that the chancellor
actually commanded the support of a parliamentary majority. But on July 22, Presi-
dent Köhler—formerly a member of the CDU (the opposition party)—accepted
Schröder’s argument that he could no longer govern effectively, remarking that
“the well-being of the people is best served by new elections.” Shortly thereafter,
two members of the Bundestag, from the SPD and the Greens, respectively, filed
an Organstreit proceeding challenging the validity of the president’s action,7 argu-
ing that the order of dissolution in the face of actual majority support for the gov-
ernment violated their electoral mandates, ones coextensive with the prescribed
four-year terms for which they were elected in 2002.
The judicial petition was not unprecedented, for the FCC decided a similar
complaint when members of the Bundestag contested the validity of new elections
ordered by the federal president in 1983 at the request of Chancellor Kohl. A full
month prior to the newly scheduled election, and over the reservations of several
constitutional scholars, the FCC, in a six-to-three opinion, backed the president,
asserting that the decision to dissolve Parliament was within his discretionary
authority (62 BVerfGE 1: 1983). In the course of its opinion, the FCC distin-
guished between the “formal” and “material” conditions for dissolving Parliament
under Article 68. The formal requirements, as already noted, are four, involving,
respectively, the chancellor’s call for a vote of confidence, the Bundestag’s “no”
vote, the chancellor’s request to the president, and the president’s acceptance of
the request. The material condition added by the court requires a “situation of
instability” (eine Lage der Instabilität) that would in fact undermine the ability of
the ruling coalition to govern effectively.
Accordingly, the FCC made clear each of the decision makers along the way—
chancellor, Bundestag, and president—is duty-bound to consider the Basic Law’s
sharp limits on the power of dissolution. Each is required, independently and con-
scientiously, to decide whether the political divisions in the Bundestag had seri-
ously impaired the ruling coalition’s capacity to govern. Yet the FCC emphasized
the political nature of each judgment, thus blurring the line between constitutional
law and politics. Although the FCC stood ready to render its own judgment on the
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merits of any proposal for dissolution, the justices in the majority held that the
president in particular should allow the chancellor a certain political leeway
(Spielraum) in determining whether he is faced with a “situation of instability” that
would justify new elections.
Initially, it was unclear whether Schröder’s Article 68 gambit would succeed in
the light of the FCC’s 1983 decision. Yet the chancellor’s reasoning seemed as com-
pelling as Kohl’s in 1983. First, Schröder had a scant 13-vote majority in the
Bundestag (out of 603 members); second, he seemed reasonably convinced that
opposition on certain issues from the Greens—the SPD’s coalition partner—and
from the left wing of his own party threatened his leadership; third, he had reason
to feel that he had been weakened politically, in and out of Parliament, by the dev-
astating results of recent Land elections; fourth, and relatedly, he was faced with a
CDU-dominated Bundesrat that could thwart 60 percent of his legislative pro-
gram; finally, opinion polls show that the SPD-led government was at one of its
lowest ebbs in popular support. Taken together, these factors added up to a strong
argument for resorting to Article 68.
But were these reasons constitutionally sufficient to proceed with new elec-
tions? The legal objections were substantial. For one thing, as former Constitu-
tional Court Justice Dieter Grimm (2005) suggested, Schröder was not “weary of
office” (amtsmüde). He might have resigned but told the world that he would not
do so. For another, he may not have been faced with a real parliamentary crisis. In
short, a “situation of instability” may not have existed because, arguably, he still
commanded a majority in the Bundestag. According to prevailing constitutional
opinion, it is not the margin of a chancellor’s parliamentary majority that is crucial
but rather its stability (von Münch and Kunig 2001, 1172-75), and Schröder had
not in fact lost his majority. In addition, the public’s low opinion of a duly elected
government has no constitutional relevance. Equally irrelevant is the nature of the
relationship between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The relationship that
counts is that between the Bundestag and the federal government. Article 68 may
be invoked only when this relationship reaches the point of instability. The betting
in this instance, however, was that the court would follow its 1983 precedent and
validate the president’s decision to dissolve Parliament and hold new elections.
This is precisely what happened. On August 25, 2005, the FCC once again held
that the requirements of Article 68 had been fulfilled (Dissolution Case II; see
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20050825_2bve000405.html). The court reem-
phasized its view that the Basic Law provides for no general power to dissolve Par-
liament. The majority was emphatic in saying that the president may not grant a
chancellor’s request for dissolution merely because he would wish to expand his
parliamentary majority. In assessing the validity of the request, the president must
be persuaded that the chancellor in fact is faced with a situation of instability in par-
liament. But again, the court felt, as it did in 1983, that this was largely a political
question requiring a measurable degree of deference to the three political organs,
namely, chancellor, Bundestag, and president. The deference was anything but
total, however. Citing serious conflicts within the governing coalition—with some
members of Schröder’s own party calling for his resignation—and the chancellor’s
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sincere doubts that he could govern effectively under these circumstances, not to
mention the president’s own careful evaluation of the chancellor’s position, the
court concluded that the president had not abused his discretion in approving Par-
liament’s dissolution and calling for new elections.8 Dissolution II, with its interplay
between law and politics, was as fascinating a spectacle for Germans as was Bush v.
Gore for Americans.
Concluding Remarks
As this article has shown, the FCC is an important custodian of political democ-
racy in Germany. It has protected the rights of parliamentarians and promoted
equality of opportunity among competing political parties while guarding the
integrity of elections and insisting on relatively equal population in single-member
constituencies. It has also defended the principle of fair and equal representation
exemplified in the nation’s celebrated system of personalized or modified PR. And
while the court has limited the right of foreign residents to vote in local and munici-
pal elections, it has otherwise sought to root Parliament’s law-making powers in
elections and the exercise of the franchise. In addition, the FCC has vigilantly
shielded minor parties against discriminatory legislation, particularly with respect
to the allocation of state subsidies and requirements for gaining access to the ballot.
At the same time, with the single exception of the first all-German election in 1990,
the FCC has sustained the 5 percent rule at state and national levels in the interest
of overall political stability. Finally, by exercising its authority to pass sentence on
the validity of elections and the dissolution of parliament, the court has consoli-
dated its reputation in Germany as the ultimate guardian of both democracy and
the rule of law.
Notes
1. The sole exception are the referenda required when adjoining states (Länder) seek to change their
boundaries or merge into a single state (Land). Article 29 of the Basic Law requires a referendum in the
affected territories and the approval of two-thirds of those voting. Any general reorganization of the states
must be approved in a national referendum.
2. The parenthetical reference contains the standard citation to German constitutional case law. The Fed-
eral Constitutional Court’s (FCC’s) decisions appear in a set of official reports known as Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court) and are published by J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, Germany. The citation format includes, in the sequence noted, the volume
number, abbreviation of the court (BVerfGE), first page of the decision, the page of the particular reference
(sometimes omitted), and the year of the case.
3. Germany was one of the first countries to establish a constitutional court after World War II. The fol-
lowing years witnessed an explosion of constitutional (or judicial) review around the world. The singularity of
this phenomenon cannot be exaggerated. It is arguably the major political development of our time, and no
less revolutionary. Consider: popular democracies have transformed themselves into juridical democracies,
judicial has replaced parliamentary supremacy, elected representatives have relinquished power to
unelected judges, and countermajoritarian institutions have been empowered to veto majoritarian policies.
In short, what was once a unique aspect of American constitutionalism has evolved into a universal feature of
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the rule of law around the world. In contrast to the American experience, however, judicial review has been
most often lodged, as in Germany, in a specialized constitutional court organized apart from and independent
of the regular judiciary.
4. These panels are known as the First and Second Senates. The Bundestag elects one-half of the justices
of each senate, the Bundesrat (the upper house of Parliament in which the Länder [states] are represented)
the other half. The twelve-year limited term of office applies only to the justices of the Constitutional Court.
They are required to retire, however, at the age of sixty-eight whether or not they have served the full term.
All other German judges must retire when they reach sixty-five years of age.
5. The special arrangement for this first all-German election represented a compromise between West
Germany’s electoral system and East Germany’s system of pure proportional representation. East German
leaders objected to the 5 percent clause because the political reform groups that had played so critical a role in
the nation’s peaceful revolution would be unlikely to win 5 percent of the national vote. The two sides eventu-
ally worked out a “piggyback” arrangement that would permit smaller parties in the east to field candidates in
alliance with other, larger parties in the west. This plan, however, favored some small parties at the expense of
others. For example, the strength of Bavaria’s Christian Social Union (CSU) would carry its sister party, East
Germany’s German Social Union (GSU), into the Bundestag, whereas the old Communist Party, now dressed
up as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), was unlikely to find a willing partner in the west to help it win
5 percent of the national vote. The PDS, along with the Greens and far-right Republicans, petitioned the
FCC to strike down the arrangement.
6. This concept of democratic legitimacy has also played a crucial role in cases implicating separation of
powers. An example is the FCC’s treatment of the nondelegation doctrine. Taking seriously the Basic Law’s
command that statutes define the “content, purpose, and scope” of delegated authority, the court has struck
down numerous grants of authority to administrative officials. The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, would
not touch cases such as these. In still another case, which the Supreme Court would have regarded as
nonjusticiable, the court declared that parliamentary approval would be required for the further deployment
of German troops in Somalia (89 BVerfGE 38: 1993).
7. An Organstreit proceeding is usually initiated by one organ—or branch—of government against
another. A constituent unit or member of an organ of government, however, has standing before the FCC
if his or her rights as an agent of the political organ have been violated. In this case, members of the
Bundestag—the relevant political organ—were able to argue that the premature dissolution of Parliament
infringed on their constitutional right to a four-year term of office.
8. Dissolution II included two dissenting opinions. Justice Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff wanted to dispense
with the court’s “material conditions” requirement, whereas Justice Hans-Joachim Jentch opined that the
requirement was not satisfied. Both thought that the dissolution was fabricated in “clear violation” of the will
of the Basic Law’s framers.
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